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The Court of Justice of the EU’s judgment in Data Protection Commissioner v
Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems (“Schrems II”; case C-311/18) of
16 July has already received significant attention. Now that the dust has somewhat
settled, however, it deserves re-examination in light of its significant implications for
the regulation of international data transfers under the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”). In this contribution I will explore four important issues that
Schrems II raises under the GDPR, namely (1) that the judgment makes significant
changes to some long-held assumptions about how data transfers are regulated
under the GDPR; (2) that the Court’s approach to the use of the Commission-
approved standard contractual clauses (SCCs) for the transfer of personal data is
somewhat tautological; (3) that the Court may not have put data transfers to the
US in as much immediate danger as many commentators seem to assume; and (4)
that the judgment may weaken the attractiveness of the GDPR as a model for other
countries to adopt.
The GDPR’s framework for data transfers
In Schrems II the Court seemed to ignore the hierarchical structure of data transfer
mechanisms on which Chapter V GDPR is based, and thus to throw in question
long-established assumptions about the relationship between them.
The data protection authorities (DPAs) have traditionally required that the data
exporter first consider whether the third country provides an adequate level of
protection under Article 45 GDPR (i.e., whether an adequacy decision has been
issued for the country of transfer), and then provide adequate safeguards under
Article 46 if an adequacy decision is not available (see Guidelines 2/2018 of the
European Data Protection Board (EDPB), pp. 3-4). This puts adequacy decisions at
the top of the hierarchy, with appropriate safeguards being available if one cannot be
used. The hierarchical relationship between the two follows both from the language
of Article 46(1) GDPR, and from the fact that an adequacy decision is based on
a deeper and broader investigation of a third country’s entire legal system than is
possible for parties using adequate safeguards for individual data transfers.
However, in Schrems II the Court held not only that the standard of “essential
equivalence” with EU law applies to adequate safeguards such as the SCCs (para.
96), but that the criteria for assessing adequacy contained in Article 45(2) do as
well (para. 104). The Court thus abandoned the hierarchy between these two
data transfer mechanisms, despite the express language of the GDPR and the
long-standing practice of the DPAs. One could even ask what point there is of
the Commission assessing third countries for adequacy if appropriate safeguards
based on the same standards are available, in light of the fact that they can be
implemented much more quickly than an adequacy decision can be approved.
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In the hierarchy of data protection mechanisms, the derogations under Article 49
GDPR rank at the bottom, since they are not designed to provide protection and
are to be used only when an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards are not
available (Article 49(1)). The Court makes a cryptic reference to the derogations
in para. 202, stating that “in view of Article 49”, invalidation of the Commission’s
decision approving the Privacy Shield as adequate does not create a legal vacuum.
This seems to imply that use of the derogations can help compensate for invalidation
of the Privacy Shield. However, both the wording of Article 49 and the position of the
EDPB (EDPB Guidelines 2/2018, p. 4) make it clear that the derogations are to be
strictly interpreted, as follows from the Court’s own holdings that derogations from
fundamental rights are to be used only when strictly necessary (see Case C-362/14
Schrems, para. 92). Thus, the derogations cannot fill the gap created by invalidation
of the Privacy Shield, except in a few limited cases.
The Court and the standard contractual clauses
Prior to Schrems II there was much anxiety about whether the Court would invalidate
the SCCs on the basis that they are concluded between parties transferring personal
data and cannot bind third country authorities. The Court upheld use of the SCCs
approved in Commission Decision 2010/87/EU and amended in Commission
Implementing Decision 2016/2297, finding that the protections they provide rest
not on the legal system of the third country of transfer (as with an adequacy
decision), but on protections that the parties transferring the data provide to ensure
an adequate level of protection (para. 131), which may include supplementary
measures such as “other clauses or additional safeguards” (para. 132). However, the
Court’s reasoning here seems tautological, i.e., it held that while contractual clauses
cannot bind third country authorities this can be remedied though safeguards
including additional clauses (para. 132).
A more convincing argument for upholding the SCCs is the Court’s positive
evaluation of the various provisions in them that allow transfers to be suspended
or prohibited when the clauses are breached or it becomes impossible to honour
them (paras. 137-148), and the emphasis it puts on them providing “effective
mechanisms” (para. 147). Having helped negotiate the 2010 SCCs with the
Commission on behalf of the International Chamber of Commerce (see FN 4 to
Recital 7 of Commission Decision 2010/87/EU), I am pleased that the Court upheld
the protections they contain; indeed, to my knowledge this is the only time the Court
has given a positive endorsement to any data transfer mechanism.
The Court did not specify the content of other clauses or additional safeguards that
parties may use with the SCCs, but, as discussed above, they will have to take into
account the conditions for adequacy contained in Article 45(2)(a). Placing evaluation
of criteria for adequacy in the hands of parties that carry out data transfers may
lead to legal uncertainty, as the Court recognized (para. 147). The EDPB has stated
that it will provide further guidance in this regard (EDPB FAQs of 23 July 2020, p.
5), but settling disputes under Article 65 GDPR between the DPAs on the types
of safeguards to be used could require the EDPB to opine on issues that could be
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politically explosive, such as whether particular third countries abide by the rule of
law or respect fundamental rights.
It is important to note that the Court does not require that additional safeguards
provide a 100% guarantee that access to data by third parties can never occur, but
rather that they constitute “effective mechanisms that make it possible, in practice,
to ensure compliance with the level of protection required by EU law…” (para. 137).
Thus, they should be evaluated under a standard of proportionality, not of perfection.
A few examples of clauses and safeguards could include the following:
• Legal measures: The parties to the transfer could agree on enhanced legal
guarantees that build on those in the SCCs but provide stricter conditions for
suspending data flows and deleting data in cases of unauthorized government
access, as well as stricter penalties for breaches of their obligations.
• Technical measures: Strong encryption could be used to make it nearly
impossible for unauthorized actors to read the data.
• Organisational measures: Groups of data exporters and importers (such as
in a trade association) could commit to suspend data transfers to countries that
do not respect the rule of law, based on internationally-recognized standards
(for example, those published by the World Justice Project). This approach is
already used in other areas, such as fair labour standards.
Data transfers to the US
Since the judgment was announced, there have been apocalyptic predictions about
how it may mean the end of data transfers to the US. However, the reality will
probably be less dramatic. While numerous complaints have already been filed
(including by noyb, the NGO headed by Schrems), the wheels of data protection
enforcement turn slowly, in particular since pan-European complaints (i.e., those that
involve data transfers from multiple Member States) have to go through the EDPB,
which has become infamous for delays. The DPAs also tend to be careful not to
issue high-profile penalties before being completely sure that they have a strong
legal case. This means that data will likely continue to flow over the Atlantic for some
time before the GDPR enforcement machinery really starts to bite.
Two of the main issues the Court focused on in invalidating the Privacy Shield
were the Ombudsman mechanism and data access by US authorities. The issues
surrounding the Ombudsman may be the easier of the two to deal with in a legal
sense (assuming the political will to do so in the US), and a thoughtful proposal in
this regard has been made by Ken Propp and Peter Swire.
The issue of government data access is more difficult, as it will require strict
adherence to the proportionality criteria that the Court set out (see para. 176 et
seq). In this regard, a close examination of the Court’s Opinion 1/15, where it
invalidated a proposed international agreement with Canada because of data
protection concerns, could provide a useful starting point. Further guidance from
the Court may be forthcoming soon in joined cases C-623/17, C-511/18, C-512/18
and C-520/18, which involve a challenge to data collection for national security
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and counter-terrorism purposes in various Member States plus the UK. If, as can
probably be expected, the judgments in these cases result in the Court restricting
data processing for these purposes, it may help identify measures that could put EU-
US data flows on a firmer legal footing.
With the Court taking such a strict position in Schrems II, any hope of a stable and
viable accommodation for data transfers between the EU and the US can only be
based on changes to US law. This will depend on political factors that are impossible
to predict, and in particular on the results of the forthcoming US elections.
Implications for the global reach of the GDPR
The EU has positioned the GDPR as the global reference point for data protection
and privacy (see, for example, the joint statement in May 2020 by Commissioners
Jourová and Reynders). Numerous countries have sought EU adequacy decisions or
adopted data protection legislation based on the EU model, and the GDPR has been
a success story in this regard.
Promoting the GDPR in other regions with different legal and cultural traditions
requires the EU to walk a fine line: the standard of protection should be high in
order to make it a desirable model, but it must be set at a level that is possible
for third countries to attain. Striking the right balance is made more difficult by
the apparent tension between the Court, which has tightened the legal standards
for data transfers in recent years, and the Commission, which almost seemed to
welcome the invalidation of the Privacy Shield as an opportunity to negotiate a yet
another data transfer agreement with the US (see the statement of Commissioner
Reynders following the judgment).
However, the judgment may cause some third countries to question whether it is
worthwhile to strive to reach the EU’s data protection standards and to engage in
protracted negotiations only to have the agreement, or the adequacy decision based
on it, invalidated later on. Having now ensured that data transfers must meet a high
standard, the EU should also take care not to set the bar too high, or it may make
the GDPR a less attractive model for third countries.
- 4 -
